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University of Tours, INSERM U930, IHPST (Paris) 
Abstract   Animal models of depression are problematic and results 
drawn from them is moderately convincing. The main problem, it is 
often argued, is that it is impossible to model a mental disorder, i.e. 
specifically human, in animals like rodents: it is a matter of resem-
blance of symptoms. Yet in this field it is generally assumed that an-
imal models of depression are more or less ‘valid’ according to three 
criteria: predictive, construct, and face validity, with only the latter 
concerned with the resemblance of symptoms. It is argued here that 
the problem is actually not with resemblance to the clinical features 
or to the factors of depression: it is not their being mental parame-
ters. It lies, rather, in the fuzziness of the definition of a human enti-
ty and in the difficulty of linking together supposedly involved bio-
logical mechanisms into a consistent picture of the underlying 
process of the disease. It is therefore not that we cannot model what 
we know to be depression, it is rather that we do not know what to 
model. 
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Introduction: translational research and extrapolation in 
psychiatry 
Philosophers tend to import their own problems into foreign do-
mains, not always for the sake of the greater good. An alternative 
strategy in the philosophy of science consists in trying to illuminate 
problems as scientists encounter them. Modeling mechanisms of 
diseases in organisms belongs to what is called ‘translational re-
search’.  As a matter of fact, in contemporary medicine, ‘translation-
al research’ is summarized through the rhetorical motto ‘from the 
bench to the bedside’. As defined more specifically by the Transla-
tional Research Working Group regarding cancer research,  
“Translational research transforms scientific discoveries arising 
from laboratory, clinical, or population studies into clinical 
applications to reduce cancer incidence, morbidity, and 
mortality”. (Translational Research Working Group 2007, 99)1  
                                                            
1 Other definitions have been proposed (see McArthur and Borsini 2008, xix). 
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Yet this simple definition contains multiple meanings. In an editorial 
for the first issue of Science Translational Medicine, Elias A. Zer-
houni, a former director of the National Institutes of Health and for-
merly a strong advocate of this approach, states that the term ‘trans-
lational’ can be understood in at least three senses: the rendering in 
clinical terms of what is understood at the basic level; the therapeu-
tic application of basic biological knowledge; and the extrapolation 
made possible by the “profound unity of biology” resulting from 
“shared evolutionary pathways” (Zerhouni 2009). Indeed, applica-
tion does not automatically follow understanding. This seems to be 
all the more true in psychiatry, where translational research has re-
cently become a motto (the first issue of Translational Psychiatry, a 
publication by Nature Publishing Group was released in April 2011). 
Many potential treatments have resulted in disappointment and 
many exciting in vivo and in vitro models have failed to tackle the 
issue of human mental disorders. 
As regards in vivo or animal models, experimental as well as more 
theoretical issues have been raised. As a matter of fact, concerns 
about the rationale of extrapolation from animal models have been 
both objected to and dismissed by philosophers (LaFollette and 
Shanks 1995; Schaffner 1998a; Schaffner 1998b; Schaffner 2000; 
Ankeny 2001; Weber 2005), so the question may need further con-
sideration in the specific case of animal models of mental disorders. 
More specifically still, scientists spontaneously distinguish disorders 
that seem to hit potentially anyone, such as anxiety and depressive 
disorders, and those disorders that seem to threaten only a clinical 
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subpopulation, such as autistic disorders and schizophrenia; the lat-
ter seem to be even harder to model in animals than the former. The 
main reason seems to be the impossibility of modeling mental fea-
tures that we find hard to understand ‘intimately’ in humans, a prob-
lem scientists apparently consider to be less stringent in the case of 
mood and anxiety disorders, where cognitive traits look less myste-
rious and behavioral traits far more recognizable.  
Is modeling depression along with its mental processes, factors, 
and symptoms in animals truly unproblematic? My contention in this 
chapter is that the main problem scientists encounter in the field of 
mental health is not the fact that depression is difficult to model be-
cause its symptoms are ‘mental’, that is, personal, experienced, and 
contextual (1); rather, it is the fact that human depression is a fuzzy 
target of modeling, and that “piecemeal theorizing” (Murphy 2006) 
is required, which is a challenge to causal reasoning in medicine in 
general (2).  
1 Translation and extrapolation about depression: the mind-
body problem? 
If rodents cannot conceive of guilt, worthlessness, despondency 
and dejection, or if they cannot worry about what the future may 
bring and ‘consider’ suicide, is there any causal pathway left for 
them to develop genuine depression? Broadly speaking, there are 
two series of objections here: 
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1. the target condition, i.e. mental disorders, cannot exist in animals 
(dissimilarity of animal models to their human target); 
2. the causal network relevant to this condition, including mental 
factors, is not relevant for animals (impossibility of bypassing 
mental causality).   
In this section, I consider the way translational psychiatry deals with 
both problems and conclude that problems raised by modeling men-
tal disorders in animals are not relevant to the mind-body problem. 
1.1 How translational psychiatry deals with the problem of 
similarity to depressive symptoms in animal models 
1.1.1 Feature-to-feature resemblance 
In this section, I attempt to give a brief presentation of a field 
largely unknown to philosophers of psychiatry. When submitted to 
environmental factors similar to some of those precipitating depres-
sion in humans, like moderate chronic stress, animal models are ex-
pected to produce some behavioral symptoms and biological chang-
es similar to those found in humans. In an experimental test of a 
pharmacological treatment, the animal should not only resemble the 
human, but the whole experimental situation should resemble the 
whole human situation too. This ‘situation’ is generally construed in 
the following way:  
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1. A disease entity instantiates in a human population marked by a 
genetic vulnerability through the occurrence of a pathogenic se-
quence of events enticing a neurobiological dysfunction.  
2. This dysfunction can be assessed on the basis of clinical symp-
toms and biological markers thanks to diagnostic tests.  
3. Any possible chemical treatment is a molecule with a pharmaco-
logical target called the endpoint.  
The relevant features of resemblance in this situation are reduced to 
abstracted and idealized parameters (see table 1). 
Parameters (human condition) Corresponding parameters (an-
imal experiment) 
Human depressive disorder  Animal equivalent of the depres-
sive disorder 
Genetic and environmental vul-
nerability factors 
Animal species and strand 
Depressogenic sequence of events Stress protocol 
Dysfunctional neurobiological 
mechanism  
Dysfunctional neurobiological 
mechanism 
Clinical symptoms  Behavioral and cognitive changes 
Biomarkers Biomarkers 
Diagnostic tests Biological, behavioral and cogni-
tive tests 
Endpoint Endpoint 
Treatment (molecule, vehicle and Treatment (molecule, vehicle and 
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posology) posology) 
Table 1. Animal models of depression: Parameters of feature-to-
feature resemblance.  
Each parameter in itself is a matter of concern: 
-Disease entities do not necessarily cross the boundaries of species.  
-Animal species display specific natural and artificial properties with 
known and unknown advantages and drawbacks for modeling a spe-
cific disease.  
-Animal strands are known for specific genetic vulnerabilities, some 
being an exaggeration of what can be encountered “in the wild”, that 
is in a natural human population.  
-Pathogenic sequences of events in humans have only partial corre-
spondents in mice. 
-Too many neurobiological mechanisms are potentially dysfunction-
al in depression. 
-Some clinical symptoms of human depression have reasonably con-
vincing equivalents in mice like psychomotor agitation or retarda-
tion, insomnia, weight loss, and even anhedonia, while others do not, 
such as feeling of guilt or worthlessness, irritability, or suicidal idea-
tion. 
-Biomarkers, that is, evaluated indicators of the intrinsic causes of 
an illness, its clinical course, and its modification by treatment 
(Frank and Hargreaves 2003), not pathognomonic or cutting-off 
signs, cannot generally be measured in situ, but only indirectly, and 
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a thorough knowledge of the specifics of human and animal physi-
ology is required to translate.  
-Usual clinical tests differ in humans (questionnaires) and in animals 
(measurement and observation of activity).  
-Endpoint of a candidate treatment, i.e. is the locus of action (recep-
tor, behavior), is ideally the same in both humans and mice, but spe-
cies may have different potential acceptors of the molecule leading 
to different potential side effects. 
-A potential treatment itself has to be adapted in many ways, be-
cause of differences in required dosage (Lin 1998), or transposition 
of places to be stimulated in the case of transmagnetic stimulation 
(TMS). 
Two concluding remarks are noteworthy. The first is that there are 
many more features to compare between species than it seems at 
first sight. Some are deeply problematic, others, not at all. The se-
cond remark is that scientists generally do not focus on the possibil-
ity of modeling, but rather on the strategic choices to make in order 
to design the best model possible. There are obviously good choices 
and bad choices, given what biologists generally assume about the 
inner working or main symptoms of depression. Nevertheless, all 
this indeed does not prove skepticism wrong about the potential re-
sults of animal research on depression. My main claim in this chap-
ter is the reverse, i.e. that skepticism about resemblance of animal 
models to psychiatric conditions, if justified, does not entail that no 
significant result can come from this field.   
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1.1.2 Face validity, predictive validity, and construct validity 
It is crucial to understand that translational research does not as-
sess an animal model by similarity to the target, but by the validity 
of the inference. The similarity of the animal model to its human 
counterpart is neither a sufficient nor even a necessary condition of 
the validity of the extrapolation of a result based on animal experi-
ments to a human population.  
Many conditions of validity have been proposed and considered, 
for instance, in the field of the study of mood disorders, where this 
reflection happens to be most developed in translational psychiatry 
(Van der Staay 2006; van der Staay et al. 2009; Belzung and 
Lemoine 2011). Paul Willner proposed the most often cited concep-
tion of validity in this field (Willner 1984; Willner 1994; Willner 
and Mitchell 2002); he distinguishes: 
• Face validity: “the extent of similarity between the model and the 
disorder (…) on as wide as possible a range of symptoms and 
signs” (Willner and Mitchell 2002);  
• Predictive validity: “similar response to treatment” (Willner 
1984);  
• Construct validity: specific similarity of the animal experiment to 
the theoretical entity referred to as the disease and supposed to 
explain its symptoms, and to this theoretical entity only.  
These three aspects of validity are not only different, but also inde-
pendent of one another, so that when one is fulfilled, the others are 
not necessarily satisfied. 
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Face validity is what is commonly understood by the ‘resem-
blance’ of the animal model to its human target, especially in critical 
assessments of translational psychiatry. Yet face validity is not con-
sidered as equally important as construct and predictive validity. 
About the relations between construct validity and face validity, for 
instance, Willner says: 
“Face validity only requires the demonstration of similarity 
between the model and symptoms of the disorder being 
modelled. Construct validity does not require superficial 
similarity which may, indeed, be absent. It does, however, 
require the demonstration of homology – the same theoretical 
constructs must be applicable in the two cases – and an 
empirically supported rationale for believing that the construct 
in question is fundamental to the disorder, rather than an 
epiphenomenon.” (Willner 1986, 684, my emphasis) 
For instance, when examining two standard protocols, the Tail Sus-
pension Test (TST) and the Unpredictable Chronic Mild Stress 
(UCMS), Willner notes that while the first has poor face validity and 
construct validity but strong predictive validity, the second has fair 
face validity and less convincing construct validity (depending on 
one’s hypothesis on the relation between stress and depression). A 
mouse that stops moving when suspended by its tail bears little re-
semblance to either the observable features or any received explana-
tory model of depression. Yet it is strongly predictive of the action 
of a drug in depression, and this is considered sufficient to assess 
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whether a treatment should be tested on humans. A mouse submitted 
for a protracted time to mild stressors such as nocturnal light, hu-
midified soil, predator sounds, etc., shows signs very much alike to 
some of those depressed human subjects display, but it can be, and 
actually is, discussed on a theoretical level whether what stress en-
tails is indeed an equivalent of depression. 
It might be objected that predictive and construct validity also are 
specific forms of resemblance. As a matter of fact, predictive validi-
ty is more readily interpreted as a correlation of results of experi-
ments than as a degree of resemblance between, say, effects of a 
treatment on mice and on humans. It says, roughly, that when the 
experiment is successful on mice, it will also be on humans. As to 
construct validity, it is not exactly the similarity of a model to its 
target, but rather the conformation of both the model and its target to 
a theoretical construct. Both what is observed in the model and in its 
target must be explained by the same underlying theoretical disease 
entity, all other theoretical disease entities excluded. It therefore de-
pends on the nature of the theoretical construct, that is, whether ani-
mal modeling of depression is possible or not: as a highly sophisti-
cated mental process, depression is hardly what rodents undergo. 
Nevertheless, the problem is that there is no consensual theoretical 
model of what depression consists of in translational research. Ex-
perimenting on animal models does not beg the question, but indeed 
excludes possible explanations – like highly elaborated psychody-
namic models. This should not be considered a reductive claim, but 
a biological bet. What scientists really expect is not to make a point, 
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but depends on the results of the experiments: it is a strategy, good 
or bad, not dogma. Of course, some scientists may try to make re-
ductionist points. Yet objecting that experimenting on animal mod-
els cannot achieve any knowledge of the allegedly corresponding 
human condition is indeed both dogmatic and bad strategy.  
Some may ask: what if the success of antidepressant medication 
was precisely defined through the very hypothesis that animal mod-
els implement? For instance, if ‘depression’ was defined as a ‘low 
level of serotonin in the brain’, then surely a certain animal model 
with a low level of serotonin in the brain could provide a wonderful-
ly predictive model… at a small price. This objection of circularity 
is to be carefully considered. So far, the efficiency of antidepressant 
medication has not been assessed through biological markers, but ra-
ther as a result of scales, like the MADRS or the HAMD described 
above, that are not semantically, but empirically connected (or not) 
with drug intake.  
For all these reasons, the resemblance of the animal model to its 
human target is but one series of problems among the more general 
question of the validity of the extrapolation, probably the less im-
portant, because what matters most is both the power of prediction 
and the theoretical interpretability of the model. 
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1.2 How psychiatry deals with the problem of heterogeneous 
factors 
An additional problem comes from modeling causal factors of de-
pression. This section presents how it is addressed. 
1.2.1 Multifactorial determinants of psychiatric disorders vs. 
animal research 
By famously urging the use of multifactorial models in psychiatry 
as well as in somatic medicine, Engel (1977) clearly opposed two at-
titudes he labeled reductionism and exclusionism. Whereas ‘reduc-
tionism’ was the view that biomolecular models should suffice to 
account for diseases both somatic and mental, ‘exclusionism’ was 
the view that conditions not amenable to biomolecular models were 
simply not diseases, which to some is the case for mental disorders 
(Szasz 1960). He proposed instead that the interaction of all factors, 
biological, psychological, and social, be studied in a system-
theoretic approach. Since then, epidemiological studies of depres-
sion have repeatedly shown the importance of sociological and eco-
nomical factors in its pathogenesis.  
It requires a body and a nervous system to produce a sadness reac-
tion, but it does not necessarily require stressful or demoralizing en-
vironmental conditions to deplete serotonin, stop hippocampal neu-
rogenesis, or produce chronically high levels of cortisol. 
Psychological and social factors obviously supervene on some bio-
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logical factors, whereas other biological factors do not make any 
psychological or social sense. Systemic approaches should therefore 
take great care to avoid considering the same factor twice, that is, as 
a biological as well as a sociological or a psychological factor. That 
is obviously not easily operationalized. 
On the other hand, it is not necessary for someone working on an-
imal models of depression to deny or even neglect the causal power 
of meaningfulness on an intelligent system (Bolton and Hill 2004). It 
is natural, on the contrary, to assume that if they exist at all in ani-
mals, mental causal factors, i.e. meanings, are already taken into ac-
count in their biological form and should not be ‘added’ somehow. 
In any case, cognitive bias, personality types, early-life events such 
as maternal care deprivation, neuroticism, and so on, all have pro-
posed animal equivalents.  
The problem is therefore not that some causal factors are not tak-
en into account, but rather that in animals, the underlying biological 
phenomena of meanings might be absent or might underlie some-
thing else, so that in the best of cases, only an incomplete part of the 
biological mechanisms of depression can be studied. I assume that 
most scientists in the field would acknowledge that. I also assume 
that here again, what they are doing is a methodological bet rather 
than an ontological claim: it is possible to study some essential as-
pects of depression in a system that does not display other essential 
aspects of this mental disorder. 
1.2.2 Knowledge approach vs. Treatment approach 
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This methodological bet is an essential thing to understand. Let us 
take the example of drug discovery research. The point in modeling 
is not to create a homolog on which testing drugs is acceptable. It is 
not knowledge-based in the sense that scientists would think: 
• If we knew how mental disorders worked, we could devise effi-
cient treatments; 
• We must experiment to know how they work; 
• We cannot safely experiment directly on humans, we must there-
fore experiment on animals; 
• What are the best animals to experiment on in order to know how 
the human disease works? 
• Once we have good models, test of treatments on them will be 
trustworthy.  
This line of thought can be encountered as a rhetorical justification 
of the method. However, as a matter of fact, the actual reasoning is 
rather treatment-based, and consists in the following:  
• We know that some chemical agents have dramatic effects on 
mental disorders;  
• These agents have effects on animals too;  
• Which effects, on which animals, will guide us toward selecting 
the right chemical agents, i.e. with efficient and specific action, to 
test on humans? 
• In order to restrain the possibilities of further agent candidates, we 
want to know how the right treatments work both on animals and 
on humans, i.e. what the targets could be. 
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The crucial point is that the analogy of causal effects is not assessed 
as a result of a previously existing theory, but rather that whatever 
the theory, any effective treatment on humans will have effects on 
some animals too; the question remains, though, which molecules 
affect which animals. Theories are not a starting point, but only a 
heuristic tool to restrain the domain of testable molecules. 
1.2.3 Relevant differences: a philosophical account of how the 
problem of heterogeneous factors is successfully dealt with 
A final concern is the possibility of modeling when significant 
factors differ – such as guilt, despair, and feelings of worthlessness. 
Modeling mental disorders such as depression is but a case of what 
philosopher Daniel Steel addresses as “the problem of extrapolation 
in heterogeneous populations” (Steel 2008). This refers to the possi-
bility of inferring from one experiment on a test population to prop-
erties of a target population, when both populations differ in causal 
aspects relevant to the inferred properties. What is needed, accord-
ing to Steel, is knowledge that relevant dissimilarities at correspond-
ing stages of the mechanism of interest in the model and target have 
no significant effect on the point of comparison, ‘significant’ mean-
ing affecting the extrapolation. He calls this approach “comparative 
process tracing” (Steel 2008, 89).  
A facilitating condition is that it is possible to abstract some rele-
vant factors, namely, upstream factors (resulting in the same starting 
point of the mechanism of interest), and downstream factors (inter-
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vening after the last stage of the mechanism of interest). The former 
can be abstracted away provided that there is no bypassing mecha-
nism linking the upstream factor to a given stage in the mechanism 
of interest (Steel 2008, 90). The latter can also be abstracted away, 
provided that there is no feedback loop. Mental factors in depression 
are considered upstream factors, whereas mental reactions such as 
rumination are considered downstream factors. What is at stake is 
the mechanism that takes place in-between.
2
 
Moreover, what is sought for is not a deterministic, but rather a 
probabilistic claim. The existence of any mechanism from X (cause) 
to Y (effect) in any individual in the animal population increases the 
probability of Y in the animal population when X is the case (Steel 
2008, 109). At least, this is true if and only if there is at least one 
undisrupted mechanism from the cause to the effect, which in turn 
has the experimental consequence that any intervention on the cause 
makes a difference to the probability of the effect (sublata causa, 
tollitur effectus). This makes the case of mental phenomena a partic-
ularly difficult experimental problem. The reason is that they are 
very sensitive, or causally central, that is, possibly influenced by 
many more causal factors than most physical phenomena. Anything, 
from deprivation of a particular kind of food (say, chocolate) to liv-
ing in a particular place, having undergone such or such experience 
in the past or having to in the future, can affect the mood in the most 
                                                            
2 Steel also refers to another facilitating condition, namely, that the inference is about negative or 
positive causal relevance only, not on the effect size. Thereby, a certain degree of dissimilarity in 
corresponding stages of the mechanism does not affect the soundness of the extrapolation. This 
obviously applies to the problem of metabolism referred to above in the case of modeling depres-
sion. 
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radical way. But this does not make it specific in nature, and it does 
not preclude a carefully designed animal model that can teach us 
something about causal mechanisms in depression. 
 
All in all, in the case of the study of depression in animal models, 
the treatment approach I described above entails the preliminary as-
sumption that what is directly at stake are the molecular interactions 
within the brain, and only indirectly the mental or social factors that 
supervene on them. This, however, does not completely abstract 
away mental factors, for it does not abstract away the molecular 
causal effects that underlie these factors in the brain. The problem is 
therefore, to identify  - the modular neuronal mechanism where some dysfunction is 
implied in the mental disorder in human subjects as well as 
in animal models; - the modular neuronal mechanism realizing this particular 
kind of cognitive process that presumably does not take place 
in rodents (say, despondency after losing a job, despair at the 
perspective of the void of a life to come without a loved one, 
and so on); - the causal interactions between both modules.  
That done, animal modeling applies to the case of mental disor-
ders without any specificity, provided that what is looked for is a 
picture of crucial parts of the mechanism, not the entirety of the 
mechanism, and that the approach is treatment-driven rather than 
knowledge-driven. 
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The conclusion is that modeling depression in animals does not 
raise specific problems because it is a mental disorder. The reasons 
why are: 1) most relevant features can be reasonably considered 
similar in both animals and humans; 2) face validity (i.e. resem-
blance) is but a minor point in extrapolation; 3) mental factors can 
be considered as supervening on neurobiological mechanisms; 4) the 
approach is generally treatment-based, that is, does not presuppose a 
known mechanism to be similar, but rather, an interesting effect to 
occur in animals too; and 5) relevant factors can be abstracted away 
consistently even in the case of mental disorders. However, this does 
not mean that mental disorders in general, and depression in particu-
lar, do not pose specific problems to animal modeling. The problem 
with animal models of depression is therefore not an instance of the 
mind-body problem. What is it, if any? 
2 Something is modeled in translational psychiatry: what, 
exactly? 
The problem of inferring causal relations from animal models of 
depression to human targets is not the similarity of the model, but 
the indeterminacies of the target. Depressed human subjects are a 
fuzzy target. The definition of depression as a syndrome contributes 
to this fuzziness, and that must have consequences on the relevance 
of likely animal models: should they display all the symptoms ani-
mal models can, or a significant subset of them? So does the fact 
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that the various mechanisms known to be possibly involved in de-
pression do not fall neatly in place. In this situation, the scope of the 
extrapolation cannot be precisely determined.  
2.1 Fuzziness 
The target population is fuzzily determined, first, through the un-
certainty of the disease entity due to its polythetic semiology, se-
cond, through the width of the spectrum of mood disorders, and 
third, through the dimensionality of the criteria of depressive disor-
ders. Consequently, the poor results of factor analysis and principal 
component analysis have repercussions on the evidential power of 
animal models of such conditions. 
In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), a major depressive episode (MDE) is defined through alter-
native combinations of symptoms. This kind of diagnostic defini-
tion, called polythetic, leads to much heterogeneity in the population 
of people suffering from a MDE. Østergaard et al. (2011) calculated 
that for 5 items out of 9, the first or the second being necessary, the 
possibilities number up to 227. Moreover, considering that 3 criteria 
contain alternate but incompatible subcases (either weight gain or 
weight loss, etc.), the number of possible forms of MDE could 
amount to 1497. The result is that many configurations of symptoms 
have not even one symptom in common, and many more share only 
non-specific symptoms (such as insomnia and weight loss). The 
problem is that no common underlying dysfunctional system has yet 
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been discovered from which such heterogeneous patterns could be 
causally derived, and thereby the unity of the syndrome, justified. 
What is, then, the possible configuration, or the core symptom, that 
animal models should display? Anhedonia and ‘helplessness’ behav-
iors are most often proposed; this is a strong theoretical claim, which 
clinicians may question. 
MDEs occur within the course of many mental disorders, includ-
ing major depressive disorder (MDD), but also bipolar disorders or 
schizophrenia. It is a question whether the nature of the MDE is the 
same under the surface of symptoms in these different cases. More-
over, major depressive disorder is different from but next to disrup-
tive mood dysregulation disorder, chronic depressive disorder (for-
merly known as dysthymia), premenstrual dysphoric disorder, the 
controversial and abandoned ‘mixed anxiety/depression’, substance-
induced depressive disorder, depressive disorder associated with a 
known general medical condition, and a few other specified depres-
sive disorder and unspecified depressive disorder. It is not so clear 
whether there are biological differences underlying these distinctions 
and above all how, if biological, these differences could be modeled 
in animals. Moreover, one can wonder whether what is induced or 
observed in animals is specific to MDE. The Novelty Suppressed 
Feeding test (i.e., testing whether a rodent will or will not eat in an 
unknown environment), for instance, is sometimes considered as a 
test of anxiety, and sometimes as a test of depression
3
. This uncer-
                                                            
3 As neurobiologist Catherine Belzung explained to me (personal communica-
tion). 
22  
tainty unintentionally reflects many hesitations in the clinic about 
the distinction to be made between these two disorders. The upshot 
is that whereas animals are supposed to model one mental disorder, 
this specificity is highly questionable and there is a genuine problem 
in knowing what, exactly, is modeled in a ‘depressed’ mouse. 
Two further problems are worth mentioning. The first is the di-
mensionality of criteria. Most features of depression can, and maybe 
should, be assessed quantitatively: disturbed sleep and weight 
change, for example; but things such as loss of interest and feelings 
of worthlessness can be quantified as moderate, mild or severe (see 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), the Hamilton Rating Scale for 
Depression (HDRS/HAMD) and the Montgomery-Åsberg Depres-
sion Rating Scale (MADRS)). It is often noted that the main out-
come of such continuity is fuzzy boundaries between normal and 
pathological sadness and pessimism. This, too, is a difficulty for 
modeling: should only severe cases be modeled? However, these 
scales are generally used as a measure of severity rather than pres-
ence of a MDE.  
Second, there is the problem of the poor results of factor and clus-
ter analyses. For instance, the key result of Paykel’s study in the 
1970s was that the main distinction was between old subjects with 
severe depression and young subjects with mild depression, the for-
mer subdividing between psychotic and anxious types, the latter, be-
tween hostile types and those with personality disorders (Paykel 
1971). A classical factor analysis of depression found three profiles, 
“anxious-tense depression”, “hostile depression” and “retarded de-
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pression” (Overall et al. 1966); yet another found that the main fac-
tors were the neurotic-psychotic axis and the depressive vs. paranoid 
factor (Kay et al. 1969). As philosopher Rachel Cooper rightly em-
phasized, the problem with all studies of this kind is theoretical and 
comes either with the choice or with the interpretation of variables 
and results (clusters or profile) (Cooper 2010). In other terms, the 
problem is the elaboration of the relevant construct. Animal models 
should conform to that construct, but a prior decision is to be made: 
should psychiatrists include observable variables that have clear 
equivalents in mice? The second question is: can the result of a clus-
ter or factor analysis in humans be back-translated into mice?  
 
2.2 Mosaicism and chimerism of models 
Despite the treatment approach I emphasized in the first section, 
some knowledge of the whole biological picture is necessary to 
model the disease. We have some indeed, but it is very patchy: areas 
of known mechanisms upon which used treatments act are surround-
ed by largely unknown causal chains. This situation leads to what 
philosopher Dominic Murphy calls, in Psychiatry in the Scientific 
Image, “piecemeal theorizing”, that is, the fact that psychiatry about 
mental disorders in general employs “generalizations or causal mod-
els of limited scope at different levels” rather than “one big elegant 
theory” (Murphy 2006, 240-1). In the more specific case of one giv-
en mental disorder in turn, Murphy distinguishes global models, de-
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signed to explain all symptoms by one general dysfunction, and 
modular models, designed to explain all symptoms by a series of 
part-dysfunction, each explaining one symptom or one part of the 
symptoms. 
The requirements of animal experiments are partly responsible for 
the prevalence of piecemeal theorizing and modular models in bio-
logical approaches to depression. One has to choose one putative 
mechanism to model it. In translational psychiatry, scientists there-
fore consider their animal models to instantiate one component 
mechanism of the disease (hopefully the key mechanism). But they 
do not exactly know where, in the global plan of the disease, this 
mechanism stands – that is, what are its causal relations with the 
rest. It may be central or peripheral, it may precede, follow, or add 
up to other mechanisms in the course of the mental disorder.  
The main biological hypothesis on depression until recently, the 
monoamine hypothesis, is an illustration of piecemeal theorizing. 
The serendipitous discovery of seemingly effective treatments of 
depression, tricyclic antidepressant (imipramine), and monoamine 
oxidase inhibitors (iproniazid), led to research on their target, main-
ly, the serotonergic system (Maxwell and Echhardt 1990; McArthur 
and Borsini 2008). Further exploration of this biological mechanism 
in animal models led in turn to better animal models on the one 
hand, and better molecules on the other hand (mostly, with less side 
effects): chiefly, fluoxetine. Many have thought that an imbalance in 
the serotonergic system, grossly in the form of a depletion of synap-
tic serotonin, expressed the main mechanism of depression (Hirsch-
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feld 2000). Yet this position hides a paradox, that of the delay of ac-
tion of mood regulators: how can depression consist mainly in a ser-
otonin deficit if normal levels are restored almost immediately under 
medication, but improvement occurs only 3 weeks after the treat-
ment begins? This question has more recently lead scientists to ques-
tion the centrality of serotonergic system in depression, and look for 
complementary, alternative, or competing hypotheses. Among oth-
ers, a possible disruption in hippocampal neurogenesis, which has in 
turn been linked to a mechanism known to be crucial in anxiety dis-
orders, the so-called hippothalamo-pituitary-adrenergic axis of 
stress, and so on to a dozen other mechanisms possibly involved in 
depression (Licino and Wong 2005).  
This situation, i.e. many different animal models of various mech-
anisms of mostly unknown importance and causal relations with one 
another, though referring to the same mental disorder, I propose to 
call mosaicism of animal models. I distinguish it from chimerism of 
animal models, i.e. the fact that several different animals are usually 
required for the instantiation of one hypothesis, each instantiating 
one part of the component mechanism of the disease, none instanti-
ating the whole mechanism. In other terms, there is not one animal 
model similar to the mental disorder according to hypothesis X on its 
inner mechanisms, but rather several animal models implementing 
parts of the whole mechanism supposed to take place in the disease 
in humans. For instance, the hypothesis that the s/s polymorphism of 
the serotonin transporter gene is a vulnerability factor to depression, 
and requires that a whole chain of events from this polymorphism to 
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symptoms of depression be established. As a matter of fact, it has 
been, but not the whole chain into a single model – it required at 
least three different rodent models. 
Both mosaicism and chimerism of animal models are conse-
quences of modeling in the dark about the ins and outs of mental 
disorders. The main outcome of that necessity to model piecemeal is 
on the scope of the extrapolation. First, one does not know the stra-
tegic place of the part of the human disease modeled in the animal 
and, second, one does not extrapolate from one type of animal to the 
human target population on the basis of a one-to-one resemblance, 
but from several types of animals to the human target population on 
the basis of a many-to-one resemblance.  
Conclusion 
What is lost in the translation of animal models to human targets? 
It was not a well-formed meaning, but rather the conviction that 
there was one in the first place. The question is not the impossibility 
of translating mental properties and mental factors into ‘animal lan-
guage’. The real problem with animal models of depression is de-
pression itself. First, the human population to be modeled is not it-
self strictly determined, and second, animal models cannot be 
thought of as experiments about mechanisms precisely placed and 
fitting nicely into the sound template of a biological theory of this 
mental disorder, for there is no such theory. They indicate fixed di-
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rections and sound natural facts about those mechanisms, but we do 
not know which directions and which facts. 
In the face of this problem, there have been theoretical attempts at 
gathering all we know about the biology of depression (Kendler et 
al. 2002; Kendler et al. 2006; Willner et al. 2012). The problem is 
always about searching either for consistent, if alternative, under-
pinning mechanisms of a same clinical condition, or for a relevant 
definition of the clinical presentation of the same biological dysfunc-
tion. Should we redefine depression after what we think we know of 
its underlying biology or should we search for a biological rationale 
of what we think we observe of its clinical presentation? Transla-
tional psychiatry of depression is at the heart of this problem. It 
tends to use concepts, such as that of ‘endophenotypes’, to resolve 
the question. As opposed to exophenotypes, that is, clinical presenta-
tions of depression affected by many environmental and develop-
mental factors, endophenotypes are hypothetical underlying presen-
tations of genetic factors of depression. In the present field, they 
consist in behavioral patterns affected by genetics only, that is, he-
reditary, possibly hidden or disguised by cultural or biographical 
events (John and Lewis 1966; McArthur and Borsini 2008). Their 
function is obviously to deconstruct the clinically defined syndromes 
into (yet) undetermined alternative phenotypes, of which traditional 
clinical entities might have been an approximate picture. As endo-
phenotypes would not necessarily be species-bound, and could be 
defined after whatever genetic determinants of depression can be 
discovered, they would totally redefine the human condition that de-
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pression is into a biological, trans-species condition. If the unity and 
reality of the condition were specifically human and relied on mean-
ings, then this attempt would be doomed to failure.  
This ultimate consequence of animal modeling – to rewrite the 
very notion of what depression is about – is neither to be fought nor 
favored by philosophers. As a matter of fact, scientific progress is 
about the naturalization of prescientific notions such as movement, 
heat, reproduction, species, but also diabetes, epilepsy, and, possi-
bly, schizophrenia and depression. Some of these attempts at natu-
ralization seem to be bound to fail, some, to succeed: how could a 
philosopher know which ones can successfully be naturalized before 
they are? For a successful naturalization, i.e., roughly, an explication 
of a profane notion through the terms of natural sciences, is not 
about the faithfulness of the scientific concept to the prescientific 
concept (Murphy 2006; Lemoine forthcoming). It is about capturing, 
in a consistent picture, how nature works. 
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